Abstract: Almost complete unanimity of the small Gibraltar community during 2016 referendum on Brexit remained nearly unnoticed because of including this British Overseas Territory into "combined electoral region" with South West England where most of people were in favour of the United Kingdom withdrawing from the European Union. No political diff erences with the UK (i.e. England and Wales) but concern about future possibilities of economic development outside the Single Market stimulated an intense discussion among the Gibraltarians. Th e vision of being non-subject of the EU's four freedoms (i.e. damage or lost present prosperity basis) would force Gibraltar to re-orientate its economic relations especially by creating and developing new trade links which could gradually replace the existing ones. Despite that Gibraltarians have consequently rejected Spanish proposals of remaining inside the Single Market for the price of sharing sovereignty between the UK and Spain. It is therefore beyond doubt that the people of Gibraltar can be characterised as more British than European.
Th e specifi city of Gibraltar's referendum on Brexit expressed itself not only because it was the fi rst time for any British Overseas Territory (BOT) to participate in the United Kingdom-wide referendum but also because the Gibraltarians were straight included in the decision-making process related to one of the most important question in the UK's modern history. Gibraltar's position in the British dilemma "to be or not to be" in the European Union structures was determined by geographical and economic factors. Being "almost entirely surrounded by water but still connected to mainland by Spain" 1 this small territory (located in area of 6,7 km 2 with population of ca. 35.000 inhabitants 2 ) remains almost entirely dependent on free infl ow of external (i.e. European) workers, products and services. "Access to the EU Single Market, and 1 BBC News, Gibraltar: What's it Got to do with Brexit?, http://www.bbc.com/news/newsbeat-46316965 (access 5.01.2019). 2 HM Government of Gibraltar, Census of Gibraltar 2012 , Gibraltar 2013 the pool of over 10.000 workers who cross daily (…) over the border of Spain, has underpinned the development of Gibraltar's vibrant, service-based economy over recent decades. While Gibraltar's most important economic relationship is with the UK itself, any loss of access to the Single Market in services, or to its cross-border workforce, could signifi cantly harm Gibraltar's economy"
3
. Taking into account these circumstances the vast majority of the Gibraltarians considered that continuation of the UK's membership in the EU was a clear need. Paradoxically, under rules of law making by the British Parliament, i.e. European Union Referendum Act 2015 as well as by the Gibraltar Parliament, i.e. European Union (Referendum) Act 2016 (Gibraltar) inhabitants of this BOT voted in the referendum within "combined electoral region" which included also South West England (SWE) 4 where more than 50% people were in favour of removing the UK from the EU. Aft er the referendum the Gibraltarians were placed therefore in a situation very similar to the one in Scotland or Northern Ireland where the majority of votes (respectively 62% and almost 56% 5 ) were cast for the UK's remaining in the EU. In this paper the Brexit referendum results in Gibraltar is presented against the background of the results in other districts being parts of "combined electoral region". Th e main objective is to analyse foreseeable impact (in short-and long-term perspective) of the referendum for social, economic and political situation of this "Britain (…) at the bottom of Spain" 6 .
Result of the referendum
Th e United Kingdom European Union membership referendum took place in the whole UK (i.e. England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland) and Gibraltar (as the only BOT located inside the EU) on 23 June 2016. Out of the total number of 24.119 people entitled to vote in Gibraltar in the referendum 20.172 (83,6%) took part. Th is indicator was the highest in the whole "combined electoral region" because the turnout oscillated in other districts between 69,4% (in Bournemouth) and 81,4% (in East Dorset). It was also higher than analogical indicators for other English electoral regions (i.e. East, East Midlands, London, North East, North West, South East, West Midlands, Yorkshire and the Humber), Wales, Scotland and Source: Th e Electoral Commission, EU Referendum results, https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/ fi nd-information-by-subject/elections-and-referendums/past-elections-and-referendums/eu-referendum/ electorate-and-count-information (6.01.2019) .
Th e distinctive evidence of the Gibraltarians' almost total unanimity on continuing the UK's membership in the EU matter was coherent and a consistent position in this question of all (i.e. 17) local parliamentarians. As well as forming governing coalition Gibraltar Socialist Labour Party and Liberal Party of Gibraltar as the opposition Gibraltar Social Democrats and the only independent MP Marlene Hassan Nahon were strongly advocated voting "remain" and formally supported the referendum campaign group Gibraltar Stronger in Europe (equivalent to operating in the UK group Britain Stronger in Europe) that brings together the UK membership in the EU proponents. For comparison Vote Leave group of Brexit advocates was composed and supported by only private persons. Widespread awareness of absolutely essential for social and economic development of Gibraltar need to remain inside the Single Market induced Gibraltarian Chief Minister Fabian Picardo to warn the UK Government that "even the most rabid anti-Europeans do not want to sever . Alarmist tone of his utterances was modifi ed somewhat as the referendum deadline approached with becoming increasingly probable Brexit perspective. Nevertheless the position of F. Picardo (and thereby the whole Government of Gibraltar) remained unchanged when he pointed: "if we were no longer to have that access, if the United Kingdom were to leave the European Union and the European Economic Area, and if we were not able to renegotiate EFTA, then we would have to carefully reconsider what the economic prospects for Gibraltar are and how we would be positioned" 10 . Th ere were therefore no doubt inhabitants of this small BOT were the most proEuropeans of all the referendum on Brexit participants.
Th e economic implications
On the assumption that Gibraltar will be excluded from the Single Market (i.e. it will not be covered by free movement of persons, capitals, services and goods between the EU member states) it already seems clear that the local economy will have to change substantially. As a part of the European Economic Community (since 1973) and especially aft er accession of Spain to the EEC (in 1986) Gibraltar economy has been driven by geographical factors, "which left no room for manufacturing or heavy industry, and had been underpinned by access to the EU Single Market in services" 11 . Services have provided work not only for citizens of Gibraltar but also many people from the surrounding area (who have made up ca. 40% of the total workforce). If then Brexit leads to introducing restrictions in the free movement of frontier workers this will seriously weaken or even damage several key sectors of Gibraltar's economy including port, tourism, fi nancial services and aviation 12 . Negative features may occur with particular intensity in tourism industry contributing each year ca. £ 200 million of revenues. Almost 95% of tourists "arrived through the frontier, which the Government of Gibraltar described as the 'vital artery of Gibraltar tourism sector' . Any restrictions on people's ability to visit Gibraltar via the border would therefore have a signifi cant impact on the sector"
13
. A related question is the weakening of Gibraltar's position as one of the Mediterranean's leading bunker ports operating in the EU's area but outside the EU's VAT jurisdiction, which allows it to off er low-cost . Another important consequence of leaving the EU by the UK will be cutting off Gibraltar from European funds. Between 1990 (since the fi rst location of the EU funds) and 2017 the Gibraltarians received almost € 60 million which (in chief of the local government opinion) "might not sound like much (…) but for Gibraltar it has meant kick-starting a lot of businesses and giving them opportunities they might not otherwise have had"
15
. Another source of fi nancing was the Konver Programme (in the 1990s) which was generally focused on "areas particularly hard hit by reductions in defence-related activities including the decline in the industries and the closure or run down of military bases" 16 but in case of this BOT (as well as the UK) it was rather a form of compensation for non-satisfactory amount of the EU's Structural Funds assistance for degraded (but not only post-military) areas. During present (i.e. 2014-2020) the EU's fi nancial perspective Gibraltar receives resources of the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the interregional programmes of South West Europe (SUDOE) and Mediterranean Sea (MED) 17 . Gibraltarian projects gains fi nancial assistance of ca £ 5,16 million in the ERDF frames only 18 . Providing discontinuation of those undertakings fi nancing aft er Brexit, the UK Government announced that "all European structural investment fund projects signed or with funding agreements in place (…) would be fully funded, even where those projects continue beyond the UK's departure from the EU. (…) Th ose guarantees cover funding awarded to participants from Gibraltar as part of the European territorial cooperation programmes"
19
. However, the UK Government promises' value in that matter could be verifi ed only as from the date of Brexit implementation or yet longer perspective.
Undisputable, the Gibraltar exclusion of the Single Market will give even worse eff ects (in both economic and social dimension) for surrounding Spanish region (autonomous community) of Andalusia and especially for bordering county Campo Any restriction of the movement of people and goods over the frontier could therefore aff ect the normal development of Andalusia and might upset the base of Campo de Gibraltar economy.
Th e Spanish factor and the question of sovereignty
Th e British sovereignty over Gibraltar began with the capture of this territory during the War of Spanish Succession (1701-1714), i.e. in 1704. Aft er several failed attempts of recapture Spain fi nally "yield to the Crown of Great Britain the full and entire propriety of the town and castle of Gibraltar, together with the port, fortifi cations and forts thereunto belonging; and (...) gives up the said propriety to be held and enjoyed absolutely with all manner of right for ever, without any exception or impediment whatsoever" 21 under the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 and confi rmed that statement in subsequent treaties. However, in the next 300 years Spain tried 20 Ibidem, p. 10-12. 21 V. Miller, Gibraltar, "House of Commons Research Papers", London, 1995, no. 80, p. 35. multiple times to regain control over Gibraltar using diff erent methods (from military actions to political pressure). In response the UK strengthened its position through fi vefold enlargement of local garrison and allowing non-British citizens to settle down (which caused the civilian population growth from 1.113 in 1725 to 20.355 in 1901)
22
. However, the perception of the sovereignty over Gibraltar changed aft er the "self determination principle" formulating in the United Nations General Assembly resolution no. 1541 in 1960. On that bases the UK Government formulated conception of possible transferring sovereignty due to the will of the Gibraltarians expressed explicitly in local referendum only. Such referendums were held in 1967 and 2002. In both of them an overwhelming majority (respectively 99,64% and 98,84%) of voters rejected possibilities of as well cancellation the Treaty of Utrecht and subsequent returning Gibraltar to Spain (1967) as sharing the sovereignty over Gibraltar by the UK and Spain (2002). (access 5.01.2019) . 2. C. Grocott, G. Stockey, op. cit., p. 116 . Source: own study based on V. Miller, Gibraltar, "House of Commons Research Papers", London, 1995, no. 80, p. 5; Committee of Observers, Gibraltar Referendum Observers Report, Gibraltar 2002, p. 10. In the run-up to the Brexit referendum (when diff erences of opinion about positive and negative points of the EU membership between the British and the Gibraltarians gradually increased) Spain returned to the joint-sovereignty proposal "as the only avenue for Gibraltar to maintain free trade and free movement with the EU"
23
. Following the referendum results the Spanish Government renewed its off er as involving "at least fi ve advantages (…): (1) it takes into account the will 22 C. Grocott, G. Stockey, Gibraltar. A Modern History, Chippenham 2012, p. 14 and 45. 23 House of Lords. European Union Committee, op. cit., p. 20. of the Gibraltarians; (2) the positive economic potential for the inhabitants of the Campo de Gibraltar and the Gibraltarians is enormous; (3) the alternative scenario of isolation would be extremely damaging to Gibraltar; (4) it would put an end to a quarrel between allies and friends; and (5) it would enable Gibraltar's specifi c but defi nitive integration into the EU"
24
. Reacting to the Spanish proposal F. Picardo in a speech on 10 September 2016 (Gibraltar's national day) said: "If anyone thinks we are going to sell our homeland for access to Europe, they don't know the Gibraltarians. (…) If Brexit means Brexit, then British means British. No means no. Never means never. Gibraltar is British for ever" 25 . In the same vein was his address to the Special Political and Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee) of the UN General Assembly pointing that despite of leaving the EU the Gibraltarians will seek a strong future relationship with Spain (as well as other European states and regions) based on mutual respect and economic benefi ts for all sides. Readiness for creating and enhancing economic (and social) links could not be interpreted, however, as an openness for changing present Gibraltar political status. "What we do like is our peaceful, Gibraltarian way of life. We like our deep human relationships with neighbours north and south of us. We like British respect for our right to choose, for our democracy and for the rule of law. Th at is why we will never surrender our nation. We will never surrender our right to choose. We will never surrender our children's right to our land. (…) British we are and British we stay. Th at spirit will never die" 26 . Clear position of the BOT authorities with silent but explicit support of the UK Government caused Spanish irritation which expressed in Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy statement of January 2017 that "while Spain wished to be construction during the negotiations [between the UK and the EU], it would not accept any deal which jeopardised its claim to Gibraltar" 27 . Although the Spanish Government had very few (if any) possibilities to intervene in the negotiation on Brexit conditions process (which participants were the UK Government and the European Commission) but engaged actively when the fi nal proposal of the agreement between the UK and the EU was submitted to the European Council. With the knowledge that the EU leaders were interested in achieving unanimity of all member states in the question of Brexit (despite the withdrawal agreement draft was formally the subject to a qualifi ed majority only), Spain decided to announce a possible veto if the sovereignty over Gibraltar dispute would not be resolved to the Spanish contentment. However, that threat began to look rather for political game (directed at enhancing the Spanish Białostockie Studia Prawnicze 2019 vol. 24 nr 1 Government position in internal relations) only aft er Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez (in offi ce since June 2018) declared he is fully satisfi ed with the British ambassador in Madrid Tim Barrow vague statement that "the political, legal and geographical relationship of Gibraltar and the EU would pass through Spain aft er Brexit" 28 . In result the only tangible implication of the UK and Spain dispute have been setting of "three committees (…) to tackle tobacco smuggling, oversee cross-border worker rights and co-operate on environmental protection and border control" 29 but the main question of the joint-sovereignty over Gibraltar have remained inconclusive.
Th e side eff ects of aggressive Spanish rhetoric have been the Gibraltar Government representatives' inclusion to the British delegation in negotiations on Brexit agreement on any matter relating to this BOT. Simultaneously the UK Government have given the warranty that future agreement with the EU would not be able to have binding power unless the Gibraltar Government (or all Gibraltarian community) will express its opinion about any regulation relating to Gibraltar itself or as a part of British Realm.
Conclusion
In the 2016 referendum on Brexit almost 96% of the Gibraltarians voted for continuing the UK's membership in the EU however their voice went nearly unnoticed because of Gibraltar's including into "combined electoral region" with SWE where people were mostly in favour of withdrawal the UK from the EU. Not so much political disappointment of huge disparity of interests with their dominant power but rather great concern about economic development circumstances outside the Single Market have provoked among the Gibraltarians much discussions about their future. Not being covered by the EU's four freedoms (especially without regular infl ow of cross-border workers and having no possibility to import and storage goods in Spain on preferential conditions as between the EU member states) Gibraltar would no doubt lose foundations of its present prosperity. In consequence it would have to defi ne a new formula of economic relations with the EU as a whole and particular member states as well as actively look for new partners which could eff ectively replace existing trade links. Despite the high probability of that scenario the Gibraltarians have consequently rejected Spanish proposals of shared sovereignty (with the UK) over this BOT as a solution making possible its remaining inside the Single Market or maintain at least privileged position in relations with the
